The Year in Review: Accomplishments and Objectives of the U.S. Copyright Office by Peters, Marybeth
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 7 Volume VII 
Number 1 Volume VII Book 1 Article 3 
1996 
The Year in Review: Accomplishments and Objectives of the U.S. 
Copyright Office 
Marybeth Peters 
U.S. Copyright Office 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Marybeth Peters, The Year in Review: Accomplishments and Objectives of the U.S. Copyright Office, 7 
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 25 (1996). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol7/iss1/3 
This Transcript is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
The Year in Review:  Accomplishments 
and Objectives of the U.S. Copyright 
Office 
The Honorable Marybeth Peters* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It is always a pleasure to be here at the Conference on     
International Intellectual Property Law and Policy at Ford-
ham Law School.  This conference is always well attended, 
the speakers always have a lot to say, and I always learn a 
lot.  This morning’s seminar concerning online service liabil-
ity was no exception, as I now realize that the moral rights 
issue may be a little different than I had originally thought.1 
I. GENERAL SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
I would like to tell you a little about the activities of the 
U.S. Copyright Office (“Copyright Office” or “Office”) over 
the past year.  As most of you know, the Copyright Office is 
in the Library of Congress (“Library”), thus making it a Leg-
islative Branch agency.  The Office, which has been located 
in the Library for 125 years, has a staff of more than 500 and 
does a great deal of work for Congress.  The bulk of what we 
do is paperwork:  we registered over 700,000 claims in works 
last year, and recorded documents concerning transfers of 
 
* Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office, Library of Congress.  Rhode 
Island College, B.Ed. 1961; George Washington University Law Center, J.D. 1971.  
A version of this Address was delivered on April 11, 1996 at the Fourth Annual 
Conference on International Intellectual Property Law and Policy at Fordham 
University School of Law.  Footnotes were supplied by the Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal. 
1. Jane Ginsburg & Jon Baumgarten, Panel Discussion:  Are There Moral Rights 
in Cyberspace?, in 3 INT’L INTELL. PROP. L. & POL’Y (Hugh C. Hansen ed., forth-
coming 1997). 
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ownership and security interest, of which there were over 
17,000 with several hundred thousand titles.  We also have a 
vast information service:  more than 30,000 people walk in, 
more than 350,000 people call in, and approximately 200,000 
people write in. 
II. COPYRIGHT ARBITRATION ROYALTY PANEL 
In addition to paperwork and information services, the 
Copyright Office collects money for the compulsory licenses 
that cable operators and satellite carriers pay in order to re-
transmit broadcast programming, and that individuals pay 
in order to manufacture and import digital audio recording 
equipment—both the hardware and the tapes.  We collected 
approximately $200 million in these payments last year.  In-
dividuals who think they are entitled to that money file 
claims with us.  If the parties agree, the money is allocated to 
the individuals in the proportion to which they have agreed.  
If the parties do not agree, then a controversy exists and we 
convene a Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (“CARP”).2 
A CARP proceeds as follows:  the Library of Congress 
chooses two arbitrators—submitted from arbitration associa-
tions—who pick a third from a pre-approved, published list.  
After receiving the evidence, the three arbitrators submit a 
decision to the Copyright Office.  The Register of Copyrights 
(“Register”) reviews the decision and recommends that the 
Library either accept or reject the decision. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit can re-
view the Librarian’s decision. 
We have the very first of those panels in process right 
now.3  It involves more than $550 million in cable television 
royalties for 1990–92.  The Copyright Office recommended 
 
2. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801(a), (b)(3) (1994) (establishing the purposes of CARPs). 
3. On June 3, 1996, subsequent to the delivery of this Address, the chairper-
son of this CARP delivered a written report to the Librarian.  61 Fed. Reg. 55,653, 
55,655-56 (1996). 
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two local arbitrators, each of whom charges $250 an hour, in 
the interest of keeping the cost as low as possible.  Those two 
chose a third person from Chicago, who charges $300 an 
hour.  For those of you who know that the intent of the 
CARP process was to reduce the cost of the Copyright Roy-
alty Tribunal (“Tribunal”),4 I can tell you that a CARP pro-
ceeding is far more expensive than anything the Tribunal 
did.  If you are looking for good employment, try to get one 
of the arbitrator’s slots on a cable panel—you can make a lot 
of money.  We anticipate the cost of these arbitrators, for es-
sentially 180 days’ worth of deliberations, to be more than 
$800,000. 
In any case, the good news is that the parties have said 
that the quality of the arbitration is very good.  All of the se-
lected arbitrators are former judges; they know how to mar-
shal evidence, and they know how to ask questions.  The 
proceedings have been very timely and orderly.  Their deci-
sion is due in June.5 
The second CARP proceeding is about to take place, 
unless the controversy is settled first.  This second proceed-
ing involves music royalties in the digital audio recording 
fund.  The amount of money that is at stake is only $300,000.  
Four parties held out while the rest settled.  The parties who 
settled agreed that the amount of money they thought these 
four were owed was $27, and yet it looked like we were go-
ing to have to convene an entire CARP.  Of those four peo-
ple, however, three of them did not follow the rules:  one did 
 
4. See Introducing the Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993, 139 
CONG. REC. E1961, E1961 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Hughes) 
(“The genesis of the legislation lies in [an] effort[] to eliminate wasteful bureauc-
racy and thereby create a more efficient Government.”). 
5. The report was delivered on June 3, 1996.  See supra note 3.  On October 
28, 1996, the Librarian adopted in part, and rejected in part, the decision of the 
CARP.  Distribution of 1990, 1991 and 1992 Cable Royalties, 61 Fed. Reg. 55,653, 
55,653 (1996).  The rejection took the form of making some adjustments to the 
distribution percentages.  Id. 
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not file on time;6 one did not state a claim;7 and I forgot what 
the third problem was.  Therefore, I think we are down to 
one party, and maybe it can be resolved.  So much for the 
new system. 
What we do know is that there are a lot of flaws in this 
system, and we are asking all the participants—our arbitra-
tors and the people in our Office working with it—to com-
ment on the pluses and minuses of the CARP system.  We 
have talked to both the House and the Senate about intro-
ducing remedial legislation to correct some of the defects.  
More on that later. 
III. GROUP PHOTOGRAPH REGISTRATION 
Last year, I talked about a number of things we were do-
ing with respect to registration.  Our biggest undertaking so 
far this year was proposing a new group registration proce-
dure for photographs that would have included both pub-
lished and unpublished works and, for the very first time, 
would not have required deposit of any photograph being 
registered.  Instead, it would require much more identifica-
tion, although the Library of Congress was entitled to re-
quest up to ten archival-quality prints from one of these 
groups.8 
The proposed group registration procedure has proven 
to be unbelievably controversial.9  There were forty-four 
 
6. See Filing with Claims to Digital Audio Recording Devices and Media 
Royalty Payments, 37 C.F.R. § 259.2 (1996) (setting the required time for filing 
and noting that failure to make a timely filing will result in non-payment of roy-
alties for the specified period of the claim). 
7. See 37 C.F.R. § 259.1 (1996) (noting that an interested party must claim to 
be “entitled to royalty payment made for the importation and distribution within 
the United States or the manufacture and distribution in the United States, of 
digital audio recording devices and media”). 
8. Registration of Claims to Copyright, Group Registration of Photographs, 
60 Fed. Reg. 62,057, 62,057 (1995) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 202). 
9. See, e.g., Discovery Nightmare?  Is Depositless Copyright Registration Wise?, 
INFO. L. ALERT, Feb. 23, 1996 (suggesting that photography does not warrant spe-
cial treatment, given new digital technology which makes authorship more diffi-
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comments, seventeen reply comments,10 and a very organ-
ized effort on the part of photo finishers who have argued 
that I am bringing more litigation into the world.  We will 
have to see where we go with the new group photo registra-
tion, as we have yet to review those comments. 
IV.  APPEALS PROCESS 
This year, we also created a Board of Appeals (“Board”), 
made up of the Register, the Office’s General Counsel, and 
the Chief of the Examining Division, to look at all final ap-
peals.  Almost all of these appeals concern pictorial, graphic, 
and sculptural works.  In addition, most involve the issue of 
whether there is any separable authorship of utilitarian ob-
jects.   For those of you who thought that the Board would re-
ject all appeals, we have not.  Rather, we have registered a 
number of jewelry designs and have asked a number of 
questions before making a final determination.  We are, 
therefore, definitely not rubber-stamping the work of the 
Examining Division. 
V. RESTORATION OF COPYRIGHT 
Perhaps the majority of the effort in the Copyright Office 
during the past year has been devoted to implementing the 
                                                                                                                                  
cult to prove); Photo Wars:  Copyright Regs on Photo Registration Has Photographers, 
Finishers at Odds, INFO. L. ALERT, Jan. 26, 1996 (emphasizing the threat that the 
new regulations may pose on photo finishers, who fear they will have to pay 
statutory damages and legal fees for reproduction of easily registered photos); 
PIA Testifies Before U.S. Copyright Office Against Group Registration, PRINTINGNEWS 
E., Aug. 12, 1996, available in Westlaw, ALLNEWSPLUS File (reporting that the 
Printing Industries of America testified that printers, to protect themselves from 
potential violations of the proposed regulation permitting group registration of 
photographs, would have to assume that the photographs customers provide are 
not the property of the customer). 
10. The Copyright Office sought public comment on whether it should 
adopt proposed regulations for the group registration of photographs.  See 61 
Fed. Reg. 28,829, 28,829 (1996).  The Office extended the original deadline for 
such comments by two months because of the inordinate number of responses.  
Id. 
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Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”)11 provision on 
restoration of copyright for foreign works.  This was the 
provision that on a date certain—or perhaps not so cer-
tain12—automatically restored, or, in some cases, actually 
created, copyright in original works of authorship by mem-
bers of the Berne Convention (“Berne”)13 and the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”).14 
The Copyright Office took the position that the URAA’s 
automatic copyright restoration provision went into effect on 
January 1, 1996,15 a date which is consistent with a proclama-
 
11. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514(a), 108 Stat. 
4809, 4976-81 (1994) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 104A (1994)) [hereinafter 
URAA].  The URAA implements the latest changes to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 
[hereinafter GATT].  GATT, the principal international norm of trade, was in-
tended to allow its members to apply remedies against unfair international trade 
behavior.  Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Remedies Against “Unfair” International Trade Prac-
tices, in GOING INTERNATIONAL:  FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS 465 (ALI-ABA ed., 1996). 
12. See URAA, § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 4981 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 
104A(h)(2)) (defining the date of restoration as the effective date of the TRIPs 
agreement in the U.S.); infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (discussing the 
difficulty of establishing the actual date of restoration); see also Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 33 I.L.M. 1197, in General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:  Multilateral Trade Negotiation Final Act Em-
bodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 
33 I.L.M. 1125, Annex 1C [hereinafter TRIPs]. 
13. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 
September 9, 1886, completed at Paris on May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin on Nov. 
13, 1908, completed at Berne on Mar. 20, 1914, revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, 
revised at Brussels on June 26, 1948, and revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967 
(with Protocol regarding developing countries), completed at Stockholm on July 
14, 1967, art. 7(1), 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
14. URAA, § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 4976 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 
104A(a)(1)(A)) (granting copyright in restored works); id. § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 
4980 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(6)) (listing criteria for “restored 
works,” including authorship by a national or domiciliary of an eligible country); 
id. § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 4980 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(3)) (de-
fining eligible country as a WTO or Berne member). 
15. Notice of Policy Decision and Public Meeting, 60 Fed. Reg. 7,793, 7,793 
(1995).  As explained in the Federal Register:  “[t]he Copyright Office sought pub-
lic comment concerning the implementation of the URAA both prior to and after 
publication of its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).”  Restoration of Cer-
tain Berne and WTO Works, 60 Fed. Reg. 50,414 (1995).  Subsequently, comments 
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tion that President Clinton issued.16  Even that did not ap-
pear to answer all of the questions regarding the ambiguity 
of this date, however, so the Copyright Clarifications Bill,17 
which has cleared the House Judiciary Committee,18 con-
tains an amendment to make it absolutely clear that January 
1, 1996 is the date of restoration for these works. 
The works that qualify for copyright restoration probably 
number in the millions.  These are works that are not in the 
public domain in their source countries by expiration of the 
copyright term,19 and are unprotected in the U.S. because of:  
(1) noncompliance with formal requirements that were for-
merly in the U.S. copyright law,20 such as lack of notice,21 
failure to renew,22 or failure to manufacture a work in the 
U.S.;23 (2) lack of subject matter protection if the work was a 
                                                                                                                                  
were received from, among others, William Patry (currently an Associate Profes-
sor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, and for-
merly counsel, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property & Judicial Administration, 
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives) and Irwin Karp 
(Counsel to the Committee for Literary Property Studies):  “Mr. Patry stated that 
January 1, 1995, is the initial date of copyright restoration. . . . Mr. Karp asserted 
that the effective date of 104(A) is December 8, 1994, but that first restoration of 
copyrights will occur on January 1, 1996.”  Id. at 50,416 (citations omitted). 
16. Proclamation No. 6780, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,845, 15,845 (1995). 
17. Copyright Clarifications Act of 1996, H.R. 1861, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1996); see infra part VII.C (discussing the Copyright Clarifications Act). 
18. H.R. 1861 was sent from the House Judiciary Committee to the full 
House on May 6, 1996.  See infra note 86. 
19. URAA, § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 4980 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 
104A(h)(6)(B)). 
20. Id. § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 4980 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 
104A(h)(6)(C)(i)). 
21. Formerly, U.S. law predicated copyright protection upon the fixation of 
notice.  Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 656 (1947) (repealed 1976).  Fixation 
became a recommendation, not a requirement, in 1988.  Berne Convention Im-
plementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7(a)(2), 102 Stat. 2853, 2857 
(1988) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1994)). 
22. U.S. law also formerly mandated renewal of copyright after the expira-
tion of the first 28-year term.  Act of July 30, 1947, 61 Stat. at 659.  The renewal 
requirement for new or previously-unpublished works was eliminated by the 
Copyright Act of 1976 (“1976 Act”).  Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 
101, 90 Stat. 2572, 2573 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-303 
(1994)). 
23. A third formality of the previous U.S. law was the requirement that the 
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sound recording that was fixed before February 15, 1972;24 or 
(3) lack of national eligibility because the U.S. failed to have 
any copyright relations with the source country.25 
Two countries that qualify under this third criteria are 
the People’s Republic of China (“P.R.C.”) and Egypt.  Any 
work by a P.R.C. citizen published in that country before 
March 17, 1992, the effective date of the first U.S.-P.R.C. bi-
lateral agreement, was in the public domain in the U.S.  
Similarly, any work by an Egyptian author published in 
Egypt before March 1, 1989, the effective date of U.S. adher-
ence to the Berne Convention, was in the public domain in 
the U.S. 
To qualify for copyright restoration, not only must the 
work satisfy these requirements, but the author must have 
been either a national or a domiciliary of a Berne or a WTO 
country at the time of the work’s creation.26  Last but not 
least, if the work is published, it has to have been first pub-
lished in an eligible country, and cannot have been pub-
lished within thirty days in the U.S.27 
The end result is that U.S. works are not subject to resto-
ration.  Because the copyright restoration provision was part 
of an implementing package that was fast-tracked for the 
URAA, the U.S. was not required to, and did not, restore 
                                                                                                                                  
work be manufactured in the U.S.  Act of July 30, 1947, 61 Stat. at 656.  After sev-
eral extensions, the manufacturing clause finally expired in 1986.  Act of July 13, 
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-215, 96 Stat. 178 (1982) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 601(a) (1986).  
24. URAA, § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 4980 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 
104A(h)(6)(C)(ii)).  Sound recordings were not protected by copyright in the U.S. 
prior to February 15, 1972, the effective date of the Sound Recording Act.  See 
Sound Recording Act, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994)). 
25. URAA, § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 4980 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 
104A(h)(6)(C)(iii)). 
26. Id. § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 4980-81 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 
104A(h)(6)(D) (requiring at least one author to be a national or domiciliary of an 
eligible country); id. § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 4980 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 
104A(h)(3) (defining “eligible country” as one which is a member of WTO or 
Berne, or which is subject to a proclamation under § 104A(g)). 
27. Id. § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 4980-81 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(D)). 
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copyright in works by U.S. citizens. 
An interesting provision of the law is that the newly-
restored rights are given to the author, as determined by the 
law of the source country.28  For example, until now, French 
film applications have always indicated the production 
company as the author.  We now have a French film applica-
tion for registration, however, listing the director as the au-
thor.  That is the very first for us:  people usually have taken 
advantage of the work-made-for-hire definitions of our stat-
ute. 
One may wonder why the Copyright Office is involved 
at all if restoration is automatic.  There are two reasons.  
First, when the protection is automatically restored, those 
who qualify can register a claim in their works, so new regis-
tration practices are necessary.29  The Office adopted special 
registration practices that were published on September 29, 
1995 in a notice in the Federal Register,30 which is also avail-
able on the Internet.31 
We also created separate forms, including a GATT form 
and a group GATT form.32 We have a twenty dollar registra-
tion fee, which is the same as for everything else, and very 
relaxed deposit requirements.33 
The second reason the Copyright Office is involved with 
 
28. Id. § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 4976 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A(b)). 
29. Id. § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 4978-79 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 
104A(e)(1)(D)(i)) (requiring the Copyright Office to issue and publish regulations 
to enforce restored copyright).  The resulting regulations are codified at 37 C.F.R. 
§ 202.12 (1996). 
30. See 60 Fed. Reg. 50,414, 50,414 (1995) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 202.12). 
31. See Restoration of Certain Berne and WTO Works (visited Dec. 27, 1996) 
<http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/fedreg/uraa.509>. 
32. See Filling Out Application Form GATT (visited Dec. 27, 1996) <ftp://ftp. 
loc.gov/pub/copyright/forms/formgatt.pdf> (supplying Form GATT); Filling 
Out Application Form GATT/GRP (visited Dec. 27, 1996) <ftp://ftp.loc. 
gov/pub/copyright/forms/formgatg.pdf> (supplying Form GATT/GRP). 
33. 60 Fed. Reg. 50,414, 50,422-23 (1995) (amending 37 C.F.R. § 202 (1994) by 
adding a new § 202.12).  Section 202.12(c)(3) sets the registration fee, while sec-
tion 202.12(c)(4) sets the deposit requirement.  37 C.F.R. §§ 202.12(c)(3)-(4). 
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automatic restoration, and probably the most time-
consuming issue that we had to deal with, concerns Notices 
of Intent to Enforce Copyright (“Notice of Intent”) that in-
volve U.S. reliance parties.34  Reliance parties are essentially 
entities which have used or acquired copies of certain works 
before the effective date of the URAA.35  One example of a 
reliance party is a motion picture company that chose to use 
a musical composition by a Russian composer because the 
work was in the public domain in the U.S. and therefore did 
not require licensing or royalties.  Reliance parties will be af-
fected by the automatic restoration of the copyright term be-
cause they now will have to license the previously public 
domain materials in their existing works. 
It was decided that there had to be special rules for reli-
ance parties, because the legislation would otherwise be un-
constitutional.36  The special rules include a notice require-
ment that mandates notification of intent to enforce rights 
against reliance parties.  Notice may be effected either 
through actual notice—by finding the reliance party and 
serving them—or through constructive notice—by filing 
with the Copyright Office.37 
 
34. URAA, § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 4976-77 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(2)). 
35. See supra notes 12, 15-18 and accompanying text (discussing the effective 
date of the URAA); see also URAA, § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 4980 (codified at 17 
U.S.C. § 104A(h)(4)) (defining reliance party). 
36. 60 Fed. Reg. 50,414, 50,416 (1995).  As explained in the Federal Register: 
Reliance parties have invested capital and labor in the lawful exploita-
tion of public domain property; the sudden restoration of copyright di-
vests them of these investments.  Without some provision addressing 
this potential loss, there could be challenges based on the ‘taking’ 
clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. . . .  The U.S. 
Justice Department in its review of the URAA legislation concluded that 
under existing precedents interpreting the Fifth Amendment, the Notice 
of Intent to Enforce the Restored Copyright avoided an unconstitutional 
‘taking.’  Thus, the Justice Department considered these provisions as 
critical. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
37. URAA, § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 4976 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 
104A(c)). 
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There is a two-year period for filing with the Copyright 
Office for the works that were restored on January 1, 1996.38  
We realized that we might get a lot of these filings, because 
there are an awful lot of restored works out there, so we had 
to put in place filing regulations and internal practices and 
standards.39 
There is no special form for filing a Notice of Intent.  
There is, however, a suggested format available in the Copy-
right Office’s Circular 38b, which is available on the Internet 
to download and use.40  All the law requires is:  (1) an identi-
fication of the work by its title, and, if the title is foreign, an 
English translation; (2) the name, address, and telephone 
number of the owner; and (3) the signature of the owner.  
The law permits the Copyright Office to require more, but  
provides that any additional requirements will not affect the 
validity of the notice.41 
Although we chose not to require anything more, we cer-
tainly suggested other information that would be helpful to 
people who were trying to identify which restored works 
were going to be enforced.  We suggested that the owner of 
the restored rights tell us:  (1) the name of the author of the 
work, if it is not already required; (2) the type of the work, 
such as “motion picture” versus “music;” (3) the year and 
country of publication; and (4) the type of rights the owner 
had, such as all rights or distribution rights.42  The fee for a 
 
38. Id. § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 4976-77 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 
104A(d)(2)(A)(i)). 
39. Id. § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 4978-79 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 
104A(e)(1)(C) (authorizing the Register to fix fees based on costs)); id. § 514(a), 
108 Stat. at 4978-79 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 104A(e)(1)(D) (requiring 
the Copyright Office to promulgate filing regulations)). 
40. Circular 38b, Highlights of Copyright Amendments Contained in the Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act (URAA) (visited Nov. 17, 1996) <http://lcweb.loc.gov/ 
copyright/circs/circ38b>. 
41. URAA, § 514(a), 108 Stat. at 4978 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A 
(e)(1)(A)(i)).  These statutorily-required regulations are codified at 37 C.F.R. § 
201.33(d)(3)(i) (1996). 
42. 37 C.F.R. § 201.33(d)(3)(ii) (1996). 
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Notice of Intent to Enforce that contains one title is thirty 
dollars; each additional work costs another dollar.43 
The procedure is as follows:  on May 1, and every four 
months thereafter, the Copyright Office will publish in the 
Federal Register a list of all of the works for which it has re-
ceived Notices of Intent to Enforce.  From the time of publi-
cation, there is a one-year sell-off period.44  Thus, the date of 
publication becomes critical because it is the starting point 
for the one-year sell-off. 
We have to date approximately 1500 Notices of Intent to 
Enforce, with many, many titles beyond that.  As soon as we 
get a Notice of Intent, we put it up on the Internet, where it 
can be located in something called Volume 8000 and Volume 
8001.45  The online record will show whatever information 
we have been given.  Accordingly, if a notice contains the 
name of an author, the type of work, or the rights claimed, 
the online records will reflect that information. 
It is interesting to note what has come in so far.  By far, 
the majority of Notices of Intent to Enforce have been for 
motion pictures.  Interestingly enough, they are generally 
Mexican films that were published without copyright notices 
before 1978.  Owners of these Mexican films originally were 
under the impression that they were already protected un-
der NAFTA,46 but subsequently discovered that they were 
 
43. 60 Fed. Reg. 50,414, 50,421 (1995) (codified as amended at 37 C.F.R. § 
201.33(e) (1996)). 
44. URAA, § 514(b), 108 Stat. at 4981 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 
109(a) (1994)) (providing for a one-year sell-off, measured from date of publica-
tion of the Notice of Intent to Enforce in the Federal Register, or from date of re-
ceipt of actual notice). 
45. Notices of Intent to Enforce can be found through the Library of Con-
gress Information System (“LOCIS”).  See Copyright Office Home Page (visited Dec. 
27, 1996) <http://lcweb.loc.gov./copyright>.  LOCIS is available Monday-
Friday 8am-9pm, Saturday 8am-5pm and Sunday 12pm-5pm, but is not available 
on Federal holidays. 
46. North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
United Mexican States, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 681, art. 1721, Intellectual 
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not.47  We have also received many notices concerning Span-
ish motion pictures.  In effect, the subject matter of the No-
tices of Intent to Enforce reveal the segments of the U.S. 
population in which works can be exploited.  We are starting 
to receive notices for films from the United Kingdom, 
France, and Russia.  In fact, Russian filmmakers contacted 
the Office with approximately 40,000 films to register. 
We are also getting notices for Russian music.  Owners of 
rights to most of the works by major Russian composers, like 
Shostakovich and Kachaturian, have filed Notices of Intent 
to Enforce their works. 
In the art world, we received a filing from the estate of 
Picasso named on behalf of “Succession Picasso,” with 247 
works listed.  To test you on what is wrong with this filing, 
note that the list for Picasso stated:  “Date of publication:  
1891, 1892, 1903, 1906.”  What is wrong with that?  Those 
dates are impossible, because there is no way, if the works 
were published in that year, that they would have any term 
left in the U.S.  They would have had to be published on or 
after 1921.48 
When you examined the filing, and looked at the descrip-
tion of the work, it said something like “Drawing of Girl in 
Room.”  Such a title offers a clue as to whether the work has 
even been published.  For example, the work could be a 
drawing that is in a museum, making it unclear whether it 
was published under the 1909 law.49  So, we have to wait 
                                                                                                                                  
Property Conventions, annex 1705.7 (1993) (“The United States shall provide pro-
tection to motion pictures produced in another Party’s territory that have been 
declared to be in the public domain pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 405.”); see also 17 
U.S.C. § 405 (1994). 
47. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 
103-182, 107 Stat. 2057, 2115 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 104A(b)) (requir-
ing a copyright owner to file a statement of intent to have copyright protection 
enforced). 
48. 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994) (providing a 75-year term for copyrights subsist-
ing on January 1, 1978). 
49. Compare 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 4.09, at 4-49 to 4-51 (1996) (arguing that displayed works should not be consid-
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and see whether or not that really is the case—was it pub-
lished, and if so, when?  If it has not been published, it was 
not restored because it was never in the public domain:  we 
protect all unpublished works, regardless of the citizenship 
of the author.50  Thus, there is a lot of confusion out there, 
but it is interesting for us to watch what is coming in. 
VI.  STUDY OF VARA WAIVER PROVISION 
Let me now turn to the Office’s second major undertak-
ing during this past year.  Jane Ginsburg talked about the 
Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”)51 during the copyright 
session.52  When this law was going through Congress, the 
Senate concluded that moral rights are a personal right 
which cannot be transferred, and suggested that an artist 
should not be permitted to waive them.53  The House agreed 
that an artist’s moral rights should not be transferred, but 
argued that the rights could be waived.54  In their compro-
mise, both houses agreed that moral rights can be waived, 
but that such rights must be viable; otherwise, artists would 
always be forced to waive their moral rights during negotia-
tions, which would undermine the purpose of granting the 
right in the first place.55 
                                                                                                                                  
ered “published” under the Copyright Act of 1909 (“1909 Act”), but noting cases 
holding that they should) with Paul Goldstein, 1 COPYRIGHT § 3.3.3, at 3:37-38 (2d 
ed. 1996) (arguing that displayed works should be considered “published” under 
the 1909 Act).  See generally Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 9-12, 35 Stat. 1075. 
50. 17 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1994). 
51. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601-10, 104 Stat. 
5089, 5128-33 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994)) [hereinafter VARA] 
(providing authors of certain works of visual art with the rights of attribution 
and integrity). 
52. See Ginsburg & Baumgarten, supra note 1. 
53. See S. 1198 § 3(a), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). 
54. 136 CONG. REC. H12606, H12606 (daily ed. June 5, 1990) (reading into the 
record H.R. 2690, which states that § 106A(e) should prevent transfer of rights, 
but allow waiver); see generally H.R. 2690, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). 
55. VARA, § 603, 104 Stat. at 5129 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1)) (pro-
viding that moral rights may not be transferred but may be waived); id. (codified 
at 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(2)) (providing that transfer of ownership of a copy or of 
the copyright of the work does not constitute a waiver, and that a waiver does 
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The Copyright Office was, consequently, required to de-
liver a study of the waiver provisions of VARA.56  Although 
the study was completed a little late, we had received per-
mission to file it on March 1 of this year.  The study’s con-
clusion was no surprise.  After the study, the hearing, and 
our massive survey, we concluded that most artists are un-
aware of their moral rights.  Specifically, we discovered that 
artists who earn less than $25,000 a year typically do not 
know they have such rights.  In contrast, artists who earn 
more than $25,000, and artists who have agents, generally 
are aware that they have moral rights.  Clearly, those who 
do not know they have such rights cannot exercise them.  In-
terestingly enough, however, it really was not as much of a 
problem as we had anticipated; people who were buying the 
visual art did not know the artists had the rights either.  As a 
result, the buyers did not know enough about moral rights 
to ask for a waiver. 
Two important issues came out of this study.  First, there 
is a real problem regarding sculpture and artwork that goes 
into buildings.  For example, there was a case in New York 
that was reversed because the artwork at issue was found to 
be a work-made-for-hire.  The artwork had been created in a 
building in Queens, and essentially took over the lobby.57  
When the lessee of the building went bankrupt, the lessors 
took back the property and tried to get rid of the artwork.  
At this point, the artists argued, “moral rights, you can’t get 
rid of it.”  The district court ruled in favor of the artists, de-
ciding that the lessors could not dispose of the artwork un-
less they tore down the building.58  This decision, of course, 
                                                                                                                                  
not constitute a transfer unless the author so agrees in writing). 
56. VARA, § 608, 104 Stat. at 5132 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A). 
57. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, 861 F. Supp. 303, 315-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (hold-
ing the artwork in the building was a single work of art, not a work-made-for-
hire, and was therefore protected by VARA), rev’d, 71 F.3d 77, 87-88 (2d Cir. 
1995) (reversing on the grounds that the artwork was a work-made-for-hire, and 
therefore was not protected by VARA). 
58. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 329 (granting the plaintiff-artists an injunction 
preventing the defendants from distorting, mutilating, modifying, or removing 
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course, did not go over very well with the Helmsley people 
who owned the building. 
The artists were not satisfied, either, because they had 
not finished the work.  The Helmsley people replied, “Guess 
what?  You cannot get into the building anymore.  It is fin-
ished.”  Apparently, the artists had thought that this project 
was going to be their lifetime work:  when they finished 
with the lobby, they were going to the roof, and then to dif-
ferent floors.  The artists who testified at our hearings said 
that had they known about the moral rights provisions, they 
would never have designed the work the way they did.  
Rather than making the artwork really part of the building, 
they would have made it movable.  In sum, building owners 
need to be very, very careful when it comes to immovable 
art. 
The second issue arising from the moral rights study 
concerned waiver provisions involving multiple authors.  
The current law allows one author to waive the rights of all 
authors.59  That provision just does not match with a per-
sonal right.  Simply stated, a personal right of attribution 
and integrity should not be able to be waived by other au-
thors.  We really found that provision objectionable, and 
made a recommendation to Congress for change.  Whether 
Congress will do anything about this, I cannot say.60  Unfor-
tunately, based on previous studies by the Copyright Office 
and other government agencies, I do not think we will see 
any action—but one can remain ever optimistic.  We did not 
recommend anything beyond that because there was insuffi-
cient information to form any firm conclusions. 
VII. LEGISLATION 
Let me turn now to recent and pending legislation that 
                                                                                                                                  
the artwork from the building). 
59. VARA, § 603, 104 Stat. at 5129 (codified at 17 U.S.C. 106A(e)(1)). 
60. As of November 27, 1996, Congress had taken no action on the issue. 
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affects copyright and to the role that the Office has played in 
the legislative process. 
A. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act 
Certainly, we were not thrilled that the Digital Perform-
ance Right Act (“DPRA”)61 is such a narrow bill—it only 
covers digital transmissions and subscription and interactive 
services, and has a compulsory license for the non-
interactive subscription services.62  It still is, however, a huge 
accomplishment in the U.S.63  This is Public Law 104-39, 
which went into effect on February 1, 1996.64 
On the compulsory license side, we started a rate-making 
proceeding on December 1, 1995, looking for voluntary 
agreements. If parties cannot voluntarily agree, a CARP sets 
the rates.65  We have a notice coming out soon in the Federal 
Register that sets forth the kinds of records that people 
should be keeping if they are using the compulsory license 
 
61. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 
104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) [hereinafter DPRA]. 
62. DPRA, § 3(3), 109 Stat. at 339 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 114(d)(1)) 
(exempting certain subscription and nonsubscription transmissions and retrans-
missions); id. § 3(3), 109 Stat. at 339 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)) (1994) 
(requiring compulsory licensing of non-interactive subscription services). 
63. See Adam P. Segal, Dissemination of Digitized Music on the Internet:  A 
Challenge to the Copyright Act, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 97, 
124 (1996) (arguing that DPRA will be “a valuable asset to sound recording own-
ers if the future of music distribution does gravitate toward digital transmis-
sion”); Jay L. Bergman, Digital Technology Has the Music Industry Singing the Blues:  
Creating a Performance Right for the Transmissions of Sound Recordings, 24 SW.U. L. 
REV. 351, 363 (1995) (discussing the need for preventive measures “in order to 
ensure that performers and producers of sound recordings will have sufficient 
economic incentives to create the works that consumers demand”); see generally 
Julie Arthur Garcia, An Analysis of the Digital Performance Right in Sound Re-
cordings Act of 1995, 8 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 13 (1996) (discussing major features 
and implications of the DPRA). 
64. DPRA, § 6, 109 Stat. at 342 (stating that the DPRA will take effect three 
months after enactment).  The DPRA was enacted on November 1, 1995.  See 61 
Fed. Reg. 65,243, 65,243 (1996); 61 Fed. Reg. 37,213, 37,214 (1996). 
65. DPRA, § 4, 109 Stat. at 340 (to be codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 
114(f)(1) (discussing voluntary agreements); id. § 4, 109 Stat. at 340 (to be codified 
at 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)) (providing that statutory rates are to be determined by a 
CARP). 
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provisions—after all, people cannot take advantage of a 
compulsory license if they do not know what the terms and 
conditions of that license are going to be.66 
B. Copyright Term Extension Act 
A bill which, until recently, looked like it was going to 
pass Congress without any trouble is the Copyright Term 
Extension Act (“Extension Act”).67  The Extension Act 
lengthens the copyright term by twenty years,68 thereby 
matching the European Community’s term.69  The Extension 
Act originated with bills in both the House and the Senate, 
and hearings with support more or less across the board—
the Library community was not opposed, although copy-
right professors were. 
The Extension Act was held up because of the Fairness in 
Musical Licensing Act (“Fairness Act”),70  which some peo-
ple refer to as the Unfairness in Musical Licensing Act.  
These were bills that were introduced in the House and the 
Senate to exempt music played in bars and restaurants from 
 
66. Notice and Recordkeeping for Subscription Digital Transmissions, 61 
Fed. Reg. 22,004, 22,004 (1996). 
67. Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995, H.R. 989, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1995) (sent to the House Committee on the Judiciary on February 16, 1995); S. 
483, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).  The Senate Judiciary Committee suspended 
the legislation after Senators Strom Thurmond (R-SC) and Hank Brown (R-Colo.) 
supported an amendment that would make it non-infringing to transmit musical 
performances if no fees are charged.  Commerce and Labor:  Copyright Term Exten-
sion, CONG. Q. NEWS, May 20, 1996.  As of July 10, 1996, S. 483 came from the 
Senate Judiciary Committee with an amendment in the nature of a substitution 
and was placed on the Senate schedule. 
68. See H.R. 989, supra note 67; S. 483, supra note 67. 
69. For a discussion of the Extension Act’s possible ramifications, see Lisa 
M. Brownlee, Recent Changes in the Duration of Copyright in the United States and 
European Union:  Procedure and Policy, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
579 (1996) (arguing that harmonizing U.S. and E.U. laws regarding copyright du-
ration would simplify the creation and marketing of products containing pre-
existing works, and would reduce the current laws’ prejudicial effect on U.S. au-
thors who first publish in the U.S.). 
70. Fairness in Musical Licensing Act of 1995, H.R. 789, 104th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1995); S. 1137, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
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copyright infringement.71  Basically, the proponents of those 
bills said that they would not approve a term extension until 
the Fairness Act was addressed.  Deals were struck with 
bars, but not with restaurants; we hope that it is resolved 
soon. 
In the meantime, Senator Hatch,72 in an effort to get the 
Extension Act moving, introduced the Musical Licensing Re-
form Act of 1996,73 which, not to my great joy, gives a lot of 
work to the Copyright Office.  The bill creates a small busi-
ness exemption, but assigns the responsibility of defining 
this term to the Copyright Office.74 
I love what Senator Hatch says—that the Copyright Of-
fice, unlike Congress, should be able to respond to changes 
in sound and video equipment in the years ahead more 
quickly, with more expertise, and with far less cost by en-
gaging in other rule-making proceedings.75  Then he goes on 
to give the Copyright Office the task of setting the code of 
conduct for performing rights organizations and bars and 
restaurants,76 and again states:  “The Copyright Office is also 
 
71. H.R. 789, supra note 70, at 2; S. 1137, supra note 70, at 2  (both proposing 
amendments to 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1994), which would exempt commercial estab-
lishments from copyright infringement under certain circumstances). 
72. Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah). 
73. Musical Licensing Reform Act of 1996, S. 1619, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1996).  On March 15, 1996, the bill was sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
and, as of November 24, 1996, the bill was still in committee. 
74. Id. at 2 (proposing an amendment to 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B), which would 
create an exemption for small commercial establishments); id. (proposing an 
amendment to 17 U.S.C. § 110, which would add a new sub-section (b)(1) requir-
ing the Register to define “small commercial establishment”). 
75. 142 CONG. REC. S2192, S2192-93 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1996) (statement of 
Sen. Hatch) (“The Copyright Office is in a much better position than Congress to 
study the business practices that prevail in order to identify improvements that 
would make the practices fairer and more efficient.”). 
76. Id. at S2193 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (explaining that the Fairness Act 
“directs the Register of Copyrights to promulgate regulations to establish a code 
of conduct”); see also S. 1619, supra note 73, § 3 (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1202(a), 
which would require the Register to establish a code of conduct for licensing ne-
gotiations and practices between performing rights societies and proprietors of 
bars and restaurants). 
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in a much better position to modify these regulations as 
times change.”77  Finally, Senator Hatch gives the Copyright 
Office the oversight of the antitrust decrees,78 asks for a re-
port on them,79 and gives the Office the responsibility of en-
suring that the repertory of these organizations is available 
to the public.80 
C. Copyright Clarifications Act 
The last bill that I am going to mention—I am not going 
to talk about the NII81 because it will be covered tomor-
row82—is the Copyright Clarifications Act (“Clarifications 
Act”).83  The Clarifications Act started as a technical amend-
ments bill proposed by the Copyright Office,84 but now has 
some major pieces of legislation in it.85  It has cleared the 
 
77. 142 CONG. REC. at S2192-93 (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
78. S. 1619, supra note 73, § 4. 
79. Id. (requiring the Register to report to the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees on the district court’s administration of United States v. ASCAP, 
1950 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), and United States v. BMI, 1966 
Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)). 
80. Id. § 3(a) (proposing 17 U.S.C. § 1203(a), which would require the Regis-
ter to promulgate regulations that would allow the public reasonable access to a 
performing rights society’s repertoire). 
81. The National Information Infrastructure (“NII”) is a “convergence of 
communications industries into a seamless web of communications networks, 
computers, databases and consumer electronics” providing the American people 
with almost immediate access to a wealth of information.  58 Fed. Reg. 49,025, 
49,025 (1993). 
82. See generally Hon. Bruce A. Lehman, Global Intellectual Property Protection 
in the Twenty-First Century, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 9 (1996); 
Paul Waterschoot, The European Union Perspective, in 3 INT’L INTELL. PROP. L. & 
POL’Y, supra note 1; Morton David Goldberg, The Digital Agenda in the United 
States and WIPO, in 3 INT’L INTELL. PROP. L. & POL’Y, supra note 1; Pamela Sam-
uelson, A Critical View of the White Paper, in 3 INT’L INTELL. PROP. L. & POL’Y, supra 
note 1; Robert Hart, The Perspective in Japan, Australia and Canada, in 3 INT’L 
INTELL. PROP. L. & POL’Y, supra note 1; Jack Krumholtz, A Regulatory Framework for 
the Internet:  The Road Ahead, in 3 INT’L INTELL. PROP. L. & POL’Y, supra note 1; 
Maurits J.F.M. Dolmans, Copyright Protection on the Internet:  Legal and Technologi-
cal Developments, in 3 INT’L INTELL. PROP. L. & POL’Y, supra note 1. 
83. Copyright Clarifications Act of 1996, H.R. 1861, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1996). 
84. 142 CONG. REC. at H5783 (statement of Sen. Moorhead). 
85. Since the original bill’s introduction on June 15, 1995 in the House of 
Representatives, see H.R. 1861, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), the Clarifications 
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cleared the Judiciary Committee and is expected to be voted 
on by the House very shortly.86 
One of the major pieces of legislation in the Clarifications 
Act requires the Register, not Congress, to set all Copyright 
Office fees.87  This was not our suggestion; it was Congress 
that wanted to get out of the fee-setting business. 
The second part of the Clarifications Act would essen-
tially overturn the Ninth Circuit’s decision in La Cienega v. 
ZZ Top,88 thereby reinstating the prior general understand-
ing that distribution of phonorecords before 1978 does not 
constitute publication of the musical compositions embodied 
therein.89  The Clarifications Act also has GATT clarification 
language, not only of the date, but also of the derivative 
work provision, making it clear that U.S. derivative works 
can continue to utilize the restored works.90 
The last part of the Clarifications Act is an amendment to 
Section 117,91 which would ensure that independent service 
                                                                                                                                  
Act has been amended by the House Judiciary Committee, H.R. REP. NO. 554, 
104th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1996), the House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual 
Property, 141 CONG. REC. D1460, D1460 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1995), and twice more 
in the House of Representatives, H.R. REP. NO. 554, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) 
(modifying the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1994 and other provisions of federal 
copyright law regarding subscriber charges, royalty fees, jukebox license arbitra-
tion, registration and infringement actions, Copyright Office fees, and CARPs). 
86. Subsequent to the delivery of this Address, H.R. 1861 passed the House 
on June 4, 1996.  H.R. 1861, supra note 85.  Although the bill was sent to the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee on July 12, 1996, as of November 24, 1996, there was no 
Senate version of the bill. 
87. Id. § 10(a) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 708(b) (1994)). 
88. 53 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 331 (1995). 
89. H.R. 1861, supra note 85, § 13(2) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 303 by adding a 
new subsection (b)); see also Rosette v. Rainbo Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 546 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that commercial distri-
bution of phonograph records of musical compositions does not constitute publi-
cation). 
90. H.R. 1861, supra note 85, § 3(1) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3)(A)) 
(concerning existing derivative works); id. § 3(3) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 
104A(h)(2)) (concerning date of restoration). 
91. Currently, 17 U.S.C. § 117 states that the owner of a copy of a computer 
program may make further copies as long as:  (1) the making of the copy is nec-
essary to use the program, or (2) the copy is made for archival purposes.  17 
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organizations are not inadvertently held liable for copyright 
infringement when they merely have turned on a machine in 
order to service it.92  There is a very long statutory history 
concerning that amendment, which was basically negotiated 
between the parties.  It is unbelievably narrow and its ex-
emption does not cover diagnostic software, only operations 
software.93  So, we will see what happens to the Clarifica-
tions Act.  It is expected to pass the House; I’m not sure 
about the Senate.94 
VIII. CORDS:  COPYRIGHT OFFICE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION, 
RECORDATIONS, AND DEPOSIT SYSTEM 
I will conclude with an update of an idea that we had 
talked about last year:95  our electronic registration system.  
It is called CORDS, for the Copyright Office Electronic Regis-
tration, Recordations, and Deposit System.96  It incorporates 
some of the technology that Jon Baumgarten spoke about 
this morning in the copyright session concerning caching.97  
CORDS uses public key/private key encryption technology, 
digital signatures, and privacy-enhanced e-mail in order to 
get messages back and forth.98  We have already made the 
                                                                                                                                  
U.S.C. § 117 (1994).  Copies may only be leased or sold along with the first copy 
of the program.  Id. 
92. H.R. 1861, supra note 85, § 7(3) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 117 by adding a 
subsection (c) to clarify that, under certain circumstances, it is not an infringe-
ment for the owner or lessee of a machine to make or authorize the making of a 
copy of a computer program for purposes of computer maintenance and repair); 
see also 142 CONG. REC. at H5783. 
93. 142 CONG. REC. at H5784. 
94. See supra note 86 (discussing legislative action on the Copyright Clarifi-
cations Act subsequent to the delivery of this Address). 
95. See Marybeth Peters, The Copyright Office’s Perspective on the NII, in 2 
INT’L INTELL. PROP. L. & POL’Y (Hugh C. Hansen ed., forthcoming 1997). 
96. See Copyright, Freedom of Information Act, Mask Works, Privacy Act, 
Registration, and Royalties, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,167, 34,167 (1995) (codified at 37 
C.F.R. §§ 201-04, 211, 255 (1996) (“The Associate Register of Copyrights for Na-
tional Programs is primarily responsible for initiating, planning, and implement-
ing projects and activities related to the Copyright Office electronic registration, 
recordations, and deposit system (CORDS).”). 
97. See Ginsburg & Baumgarten, supra note 1. 
98. Id. 
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first electronic registration.  It came on February 27, 1996 
from a student at Carnegie Mellon University who submit-
ted a doctoral thesis through the Internet.  We received and 
registered it, thereby putting CORDS in business. 
CORDS is an exciting system.  As soon as the Copyright 
Office gets an application, we acknowledge its receipt.  All 
the correspondence is through e-mail, and the certificate is 
made automatically. 
CORDS will be deployed very, very slowly.  The only 
way that you can ever receive acceptance for a new system is 
to make sure the system has no bugs.  Practically speaking, 
then, you have to start with small groups.  Only when the 
system looks like it is operating well do you add additional 
groups.  Consequently, CORDS will be deployed gradually 
over the next five years.  This year, we will be sticking 
largely to textual material with a few graphics, but then will 
be expanding into illustrations and photographs, sound re-
cordings, and, ultimately, motion pictures.   
We think the day is coming when total electronic regis-
tration is both possible and popular.  We would have a re-
pository to ensure that the work is authentic and a rights 
management component to ensure that people can make 
their terms and conditions available.  As a result, there is 
great hope for CORDS, although, for now, the system has 
made only its first registration. 
Thank you very much. 
